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Battery in Medical Torts
Don S. Smith*
M ALPRACTICE ACTIONS against professional medical practi-
tioners are ordinarily thought of as being founded on a
negligent act that results in injury to the patient. A number of
cases, however, deal with another type of tortious conduct-the
intentional infliction of harmful bodily contact on the person of
the plaintiff. The tort is a battery, and the typical situation in
which it arises is where an operation or treatment is performed
on a patient who has not consented to it. This area of malprac-
tice law takes its outlines from four early cases-Mohr v. Wil-
liams,' Pratt v. Davis,2 Rolater v. Strain,3 and Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital.4 In Mohr, the physician obtained
his patient's consent to an operation on her right ear, then per-
formed an operation on her left ear. In Pratt, the patient con-
sented to an operation on her womb. The operation went far
beyond her expectations and her ovaries and uterus were en-
tirely removed. In Rolater, a bone was removed from the pa-
tient's foot, although she had extracted a promise from the sur-
geon that he would not do this. In Schloendorff, an operation
was performed on the patient while she was under anesthesia
for diagnosis. In all four cases the defendants were held liable.
Professor McCoid analyzed these four cases in an exhaustive
and authoritative article in the Minnesota Law Review5 which
has become the point of departure for courts and subsequent
writers. His synthesis of the four cases concluded that
. . . [e]very individual has a right to the inviolability of his
person which forbids a surgeon or physician to invade the
bodily integrity of his person. Whenever a surgeon or
physician, without the patient's permission, performs an
operation or renders medical treatment, he prima facie com-
mits a battery.6
Classification of this tort as a battery has created a number
of problems. Battery law developed certain doctrines long before
modern medical practice took shape, and the context in which
the law of battery evolved was the violent infliction of personal
injury or indignity on another with an intent to do harm. These
*Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
1 95 Minn. 261, 104 N. W. 12, 1 L. R. A. (n. s.) 439 (1905).
2 224 Ill. 300, 79 N. E. 562, 7 L. R. A. (n. s.) 609 (1906).
3 39 Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 96, 50 L. R. A. (n. s.) 880 (1913).
4 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914).
5 McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment,
41 Minn. L. Rev. 381 (1957).
6 Id., at 392.
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doctrines have not proved useful in many situations involving
the medical assault and battery, which is described by courts
which find the classification bothersome as "technical" as-
sault and battery. The purpose of this paper is not so much to
explore when and under what circumstances a battery takes
place but to deal with the problems which the classification itself
creates. These include questions of the applicability of special
malpractice statutes of limitation, whether an action can be
maintained under the Federal Tort Claims Act, coverage under
malpractice insurance policies, causation and damages, and the
requirement of expert medical testimony to provide a standard
against which the conduct of the defendant may be measured.
Statutes of Limitation
Malpractice actionss in many states are subject to specific
statutes of limitations, 9 some of which are shorter than the
statute applicable to ordinary personal injury actions.' 0 Fre-
quently a tardy claimant will attempt to sue a physician on
grounds subject to a more generous limitation. The attempts
usually meet with failure. The general rule is that the ap-
plicability of the limitation is determined not by the form of the
action, but by its object. The improper performance by a phy-
sician of his duties, whereby a patient is injured, is malpractice,
and any action for damages is subject to the malpractice statute
of limitations.1 ' Thus attempts to avoid the statute by suing on
a promise to cure, 12 false representations, 13 or a special wrong-
7 See, e.g., Lane v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 850 (D. C. Va. 1964).
8 There is some diversity in the holdings as to which defendants are cov-
ered by such statutes. Compare Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 199
N. E. 2d 878 (1964), which held that actions against nurses were not en-
compassed by the malpractice limitations, with Monahan v. Devinny, 229
N. Y. S. 60, 223 App. Div. 547 (1954), following the more generally accepted
view that suits against nurses are within the statute.
9 Ala. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 25(1) (Supp. 1955); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 37-205
(1947); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 87, § 1-6 (1953); Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat.
§ 52-584 (1958); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 2-627 (Burns Replacement 1946); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 413.140 (Baldwin 1955); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 112, § 93 (1954);
Mass. Laws Ann. c. 260 § 4 (Michie Supp. 1963); Mich. Comp. Laws § 609.13
(1948); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 77.9193 (Mason 1927); Mo. Laws 1945, p. 644; Neb.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-208 (1943); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.4 (1955); N. Y.
Civil Pr. Law & Rules § 214; N. D. Code Ann. § 28-01-18 (1960); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2305.11 (Baldwin 1964); SDC 1960 Supp. 33.0232.
10 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 112, § 93 (1954); Mich. Comp. Laws § 609.13 (1948);
N. Y. Civil Pr. Law & Rules § 214; SDC 1960 Supp. 33.0232.
11 Barnhoff v. Aldridge, 327 Mo. 767, 38 S. W. 2d 1029, 74 A. L. R. 1252
(1931).
12 Baysinger v. Hanser, 355 Mo. 1042, 199 S. W. 2d 644 (1947).
13 See, e.g., Stacey v. Pantano, 177 Neb. 694, 131 N. W. 2d 163 (1964); Com-
pare Camposano v. Claiborn, 2 Conn. Cir. 135, 196 A. 2d 129 (1963), where
an assurance that an operation would leave only hairline scars came under
the 3-year limitation for oral contracts rather than under the shorter mal-
practice statute.
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ful death action, 14 are usually unsuccessful. Some states have
the same limitation for assault and battery as for malpractice; 15
others have a longer statute of limitation for assault and battery
than for malpractice. It may be predicted that unless the as-
sault takes place outside the context of the physician-patient re-
lationship, the malpractice statute will control. Apparently the
same result occurs in those states which have a shorter statute
for assault and battery than for malpractice. Colorado provides
one year for assault and battery 16 and two years for malprac-
tice." Unauthorized operations there have been held to be con-
trolled by the special malpractice statute. The Colorado court
in Maercklein v. Smith'8 held:
The majority rule is that such an action is essentially one
involving negligence and that the statute of limitation re-
specting negligence cases is properly applicable regardless of
the form of the action by which liability is sought to be
enforced. 19
While the legislative intent behind specific malpractice limi-
tation statutes is not entirely clear, 20 it is clear that they will
be held applicable even though the tort technically constitutes
an assault and battery.
14 Barnhoff v. Aldridge, supra n. 11.
15 E.g., Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.11 (1953).
16 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 87-1-2 (1963).
17 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 87-1-6 (1963).
18 129 Colo. 72, 77, 266 P. 2d 1095, 1097 (1954). And see- Francis v. Brooks,
24 Ohio App. 136, 156 N. E. 609 (1926). After the defendant, a dentist, had
removed plaintiff's tooth by cutting away a portion of her jawbone, the jaw
was broken. Plaintiff originally alleged "malpractice," and later amended
to charge that she had objected to the removal of that particular tooth on
the advice of her personal dentist and the removal had taken place over
her protests. The statute of limitations for assault and battery was one
year; the malpractice limitation then was longer. The dentist argued that
the amendment was barred because the year prescribed in the assault and
battery limitation had run. The court held that the assault and battery
amendment was not a separate cause of action, but an incident of the mal-
practice, and did not change the basic malpractice character of the action.
19 Id., at 76. Dr. Roger Johnson, in Medical Malpractice-Doctrines of Res
Ipsa Loquitur and Informed Consent, 37 Colo. L. Rev. 182 (1965), approves
the result of the Smith case in that:
"The obtaining of consent, be it 'informed' or 'uninformed,' constitutes
and is a significant part of the over-all physician-patient relationship.
If the treatment recommended to be performed and the patient's under-
standing of what is to be done do not coincide, an act of negligence
may be the result-i.e., the failure in the first instance, to inform of
known or suspected inherent medical or surgical risks."
20 It has been suggested that the statutes represented legislative reaction
to judicial doctrines tolling the statute of limitations. Comment, Handling
the Unique Problems of Medical Malpractice Actions, 10 S. Dak. L. Rev. 137
(1965).
Jan., 1967
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Actions Under the Federal Torts Claims Act
Classification of a medical tort as an assault or battery has
important consequences in actions under the Federal Torts
Claims Act 2 l which arises out of treatment in Veterans Admin-
istration Hospitals. In Moos v. United States,22 the plaintiff had
consented to an operation on his left leg and hip. After regaining
consciousness, he found that the operation had been mistakenly
performed on his right leg and hip. The court concluded that
this constituted an assault and battery under Minnesota law,
citing Mohr v. Williams, 23 and further noted that such classifi-
cation was not peculiar to that jurisdiction but was the general
rule. This brought the action within the exception of Section
2680 (h) of the Federal Torts Claims Act, 24 which exempts the
government from "any claim arising out of assault and battery."
The court's reasoning was that since there appeared no legisla-
tive intent to confine this section to traditional assaults, classifi-
cation of the act as an assault and battery meant exclusion.
Subsequent litigation on this point has generally dealt with
attempts to show that although the injury was directly caused by
an assault and battery, actionable negligence on the part of the
government employees exposed the patient to the battery. In
Moos, the plaintiff was unable to found his action on the negli-
gence of the hospital personnel in transferring the site of the
operation, since the injury "arose out of" 25 the assault and bat-
tery. However, in Panella v. United States26 a hospital inmate
recovered damages when stabbed by another inmate on the
theory that the hospital negligently failed to supervise. In a
later case a patient failed to recover damages when the assault
and battery was committed by professional personnel.2 7 The
rule seems to be that if the tort is classified as an assault or
battery, negligence leading up to the final tortious act is ex-
cluded under the Act when committed by government employees,
because Congress intended to bar such suits under whatever
legal theory they may be brought.2 s This approach has been
carried to what one must hope are its limits in Pendarvis v.
United States,29 where the plaintiff was seized and beaten by
21 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b) (1940).
22 118 F. Supp. 275 (D. Minn. 1954), aff'd, 225 F. 2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955).
23 Supra n. 1.
24 28 U. S. C. § 2680(h) (1952). This section further excludes "false im-
prisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights."
25 Supra n. 22.
26 216 F. 2d 622 (S. D. N. Y. 1954).
27 Rufino v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 132 (S. D. N. Y. 1954).
28 See Klein v. United States, 268 F. 2d 63 (2d Cir. 1959).
29 241 F. Supp. 8 (D. C. So. Car. 1965).
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a band of soldiers while he stood in the front yard of his home.
Later he was taken by the soldiers to a field hospital. There he
was treated in an allegedly negligent manner which caused addi-
tional injuries. The action by the soldiers constituted a battery,
and thus was excluded. But the court held that recovery for the
subsequent negligent medical treatment also was barred. The
medical treatment that was given to the plaintiff was a direct
result of the assault and thus was excluded. The court felt that
It would be illogical to hold that the government could not
be held liable if plaintiff had been instantly killed while being
assaulted, and that the government could be liable for al-
legedly negligent medical treatment of non-fatal wounds
resulting from the assault.30
If this case is followed, it will mean that not only is malpractice
by professional personnel which is classified as assault and bat-
tery excluded under the Act, but it will mean that it is excluded
even though it is mere professional negligence if the reason the
patient needs medical attention in the first place is because he
was victimized by an assault and battery at the hands of a gov-
ernment employee. Although this might prove to be a boon to
experimental medicine, the case is wrong, and it should not be
followed. Where the initial assault and battery is committed
by persons having no connection with the medical treatment of
the injury, and the medical negligence is subsequent thereto, the
medical negligence should be actionable without reference to the
reasons why treatment was needed. If the courts feel compelled
to follow Moos, it is sufficiently limited by holding that negli-
gence involved in the medical treatment, by medical personnel,
cannot be isolated and sued upon but is merged with the medi-
cal battery that finally results.
Recently Moos has come under direct attack in a case in
another Circuit Court. In Lane v. United States3 1 the only
factual distinction from the Moos case, other than the plaintiff's
sex, was that the surgeon operated on the wrong knee rather than
on the wrong hip. In Lane the court said Moos was wrong. It
agreed that the general rule was that such an unauthorized op-
eration was regarded as an assault and battery, but felt that
Congress never intended the "assault and battery" language to
cover "technical" 32 assaults which were clearly unintended. The
surgeon did not commit an intentional wrongful act, but one
which arose out of his negligence.
30 Id. at 10.
31 Supra n. 7.
32 Id., at 853.
Jan., 1967
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Coverage Under Malpractice Insurance Policies
Insurance coverage in malpractice cases can be troublesome
when the tort is classified as assault and battery. The problems
are, first, that the public policy is against permitting one to in-
sure against liability for his illegal and wilful acts on the theory
that insurance would encourage such activities; 33 and second,
whether assault and battery is included within the general cov-
erage clause3 4 and not excluded by the exceptions.
The public policy argument against such insurance, which
is itself subject to doubt as to its continued validity,35 should
not and has not been applied to prohibit malpractice insurance
against assault and battery claims.36
Litigation in this area has to do with policy coverage. There
are suprisingly few cases. There are perhaps two explanations
for this. The first has to do with successfully writing and selling
such policies. Doctors are extremely concerned with their mal-
practice coverage. 37 Medical publications are filled with articles
dealing with malpractice insurance coverage,3 s and some firms
specialize as Medical Insurance Consultants. 39 With such chains
of communication open, it would be unwise for an insurance
company to litigate coverage on the basis that technically as-
sault and battery might not be covered. The other reason is
that the courts would not be sympathetic to such arguments.
33 See, e.g., Northwest Amusement Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 165
Ore. 284, 107 P. 2d 110, 132 A. L. R. 118 (1940).
34 Hirsch, Insuring Against Medical Professional Liability, 12 Vand. L. Rev.
667, at 669 (1959):
"Most companies use the form of the Physicians', Surgeons', and Dentists'
Professional Liability Policy adopted by the National Bureau of Casual-
ty Underwriters. The coverage provisions state that the company agrees:
"To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be-
come legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury arising out
of malpractice, error or mistake in rendering or failing to render pro-
fessional services in the practice of the insured's profession... .)"
35 See, e.g., Wolff v. General Casualty Company of America, 68 N. M. 292,
361 P. 2d 330 (1961), holding that a policy insuring against liability for per-
sonal injury claims without expressly limiting coverage to accidents or
excepting law violations covered liability for injuries resulting from assault
and battery.
36 It has been suggested that public policy should prohibit a clause in a
malpractice insurance policy which would ". . . release an insurer from
claims resulting from unlawful acts, such as assault and battery in operating
without permission." Franklin, What Should Be in a Malpractice Insurance
Policy, 14 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 478, at 482 (1965).
37 See generally, Schroeder, Insurance Protection and Damage Awards in
Medical Malpractice, 25 Ohio St. L. J. 323 (1964).
38 The Journal of Medical Economics carried some thirteen articles on in-
surance in 1965.
39 Firms regularly advertise in medical periodicals as "Medical Insurance
Specialists."
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Typical of the judicial attitude towards insurance coverage
is Shehee v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.40 The patient had
been subjected to an esophagoscopy, during the course of which
her esophagus was punctured. Complications resulted. The
patient successfully contended that the operation was undertaken
without her consent. The insurance company then maintained
that its policy did not cover any liability of the physician for
performing an operation without the consent of the patient. The
basic coverage clause provided general coverage against dam-
ages "on account of any malpractice, error, or mistake." How-
ever, the policy further provided that "Assault and battery shall
be deemed an accident within the meaning of this Policy unless
committed by or at the direction of the insured." The court noted
that the insured by paying premiums would expect to be cov-
ered in this situation. Also, the insurer would share in the idea
that the intent of the clause was to exclude "assault and battery"
committed by wilful violence. The court held
[A] reasonable interpretation of the term "assault and bat-
tery" as used in the policy provision quoted, is that it means
a willful or intentional, an unlawful or criminal, act of vio-
lence, not an incident such as we have here where, ob-
viously, failure to obtain the patient's consent was due to
inadvertence.4 1
The thrust of this holding is weakened by the court's going on
to draw a distinction between "assault and battery" and mal-
practice. Noting that the fundamental distinction between as-
sault and battery and negligence constituting malpractice is that
the former is intentional and the latter unintentional, the court
said:
[F]ailure to obtain the patient's consent was unintentional.
It was a mere oversight. It did not constitute assault and
battery. It was an act of malpractice, and in our judgment
was covered by the policies.42
The conclusion that may be drawn from this is that operations
without the consent of patients will be found covered by standard
malpractice insurance policies, as both the insured and the in-
suror expect them to be. In Shehee, the court felt that it was
necessary to disagree with the general classification of such torts
as "assault and battery." However, the point is that it did what-
ever it felt necessary to conclude that coverage existed.
More difficult cases are presented where the tort not only
is classified as assault and battery, but also falls within local
definitions of "criminal" acts. Many malpractice policies ex-
40 122 F. Supp. 1 (W. D. La. 1954).
41 Id., p. 6.
42 Ibid.
Jan., 1967
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clude liability in these situations.43 In Thoresen v. Roth,4 4 the
plaintiff alleged that he was examined without authorization by
a psychiatrist, given sedatives without his consent, and while
unconscious taken to a psychopathic hospital and held for several
days against his will. His action was for assault, false imprison-
ment, violation of civil rights, and violation of the Illinois Mental
Health Code. The court held that this was covered by the mal-
practice policy distinguishing between the "legal theories of re-
covery" 45 and the "operative facts of the claim." 41 The opera-
tive facts of the claim were that the nurses administered the
sedative and removed him to the psychopathic hospital. This
was ". . . rendering or failing to render . . . medical . . . or
nursing treatment," and was thus malpractice within the policy
definition. Other courts have held squarely that "Malpractice
includes the performance of criminal acts." 47 And more re-
cently,48 when the insurance company failed to defend the in-
sured in an action for assault for placing the patient in a sani-
tarium for the mentally ill on the basis that this was "a criminal
assault," the court in holding for the insured asked:
Can the defendant offer plaintiff a policy to protect him from
damages for malpractice (which embraces an assault) in
one breath, and then in the other breath turn around and
exempt assault? If that be the case what have they given to
the insured? 49
The "criminal acts" exclusion does serve some purpose. It
is thought that such language would cover abortions, etc., but
insurance coverage under the standard clause might prove
questionable in a case such as one where a Georgia doctor, in a
fit of pique because his patient rebelled at taking some medicine
he had prescribed, ordered her strapped down on the operating
table. He told her that the best way to examine her healing
appendectomy scar was to go through her vagina and uterus.
While she screamed and pleaded, he thrust a surgical instrument
into her womb and twirled it violently, dismembering and kill-
ing an unborn child. He then left the patient to get off the table,
43 Hirsch, supra n. 34, at p. 671.
44 351 F. 2d 573 (7th Cir. 1965).
45 Id., p. 567.
46 Ibid.
47 Bakewell v. Kahle, 232 P. 2d 127 (Mont. 1951) (chiropractor made an
"adjustment" over the protests of the patient); Cramer v. Price, 84 Ohio
App. 255, 82 N. E. 2d 874 (1948) (holding that under Ohio law malpractice
covers even unlawful, wilful acts); Physicians' and Dentists' Business Bu-
reau v. Dray, 8 Wash. 2d 38, 111 P. 2d 568 (1941) (unauthorized removal
of uterus, an illegal act, was "malpractice").
48 Sommer v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, 171 F. Supp. 84 (E. D.
Mo. 1959).
49 Id., at 87.
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struggle into her clothes, and get home the best way she could.
All the while she was bleeding copiously.50 Would this be cov-
ered by a standard policy which insured against claims arising
out of "malpractice," but excluded "assaults and batteries"? The
probable holding would be that it does not. The courts now hold
that "inadvertent" acts of physicians, which technically amount
to assault and battery, are covered by the "malpractice" clause.
The intent of the assault and battery exclusion clause is to ex-
clude wilfully criminal acts. It would not be inconsistent then
to rule that it is within the intent of the policy to exclude those
acts of physicians which, although arising in some manner out
of the physician-patient relationship, are designedly wicked.
Damages and Causation
It is not necessary to show actual physical injury to recover
damages in assault and battery cases. 51 Some cases, such as that
involving a patient who received a fellow patient's vasectomy
rather than the hemorrhoid operation he expected, 52 create dam-
age issues which are much better handled by the ingenuity of
trial counsel than in the vacuum of reading appellate decisions.
In other medical assault and battery cases, however, the treat-
ment is undertaken in good faith by the physician, performed
with the requisite professional skill, and the result is beneficial.
If the treatment is unauthorized it has invaded the patient's right
to be free from unwanted contact, and the invasion of this in-
terest is compensable. The principal item of damages is "bodily
harm." Pain or any impairment or alteration of the physical con-
dition of the body constitute bodily harm.5 3 Thus in Church v.
50 Keen v. Coleman, 67 Ga. App. 331, 20 S. E. 2d 175 (1942).
51 Prosser, Law of Torts, § 9 (3d ed. 1964).
52 Huggins v. Graves, 337 F. 2d 486 (6th Cir. 1964).
53 Restatement, Torts § 15 (2d Ed. 1965). Special circumstances may in-
crease damages in a given case. As to "consequential damages" see Corp-
man v. Boyer, 171 Ohio St. 233, 169 N. E. 2d 14 (1960) and the comments
thereon in, Oleck, Cases on Damages, 50 (1962). In Rogers v. Lumbermens
Mutual Casualty Company, 119 So. 2d 649 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960), the
surgeon extended his appendectomy operation and performed a hysterec-
tomy. Apparently good surgery and medical ethics both dictated that the
operation be extended, but the lack of an emergency made the extension
tortious. Even though the results were beneficial, damages were awarded.
The special circumstances that justified the award were the patient's back-
ground. After having one child, she remarried, and desperately wanted to
have more children. She had been consulting doctors for six years in a
fruitless quest to become capable of having children, and convincing testi-
mony was elicited to the effect that she attached great importance to this
and would never have consented to an operation that wculd remove her
reproductive organs.
Jan., 1967
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Adler, 4 where the physician extended the scope of his operation
to remove the patient's diseased ovaries, to which the patient
had consented, and performed an appendectomy to which she
had not consented, the patient was allowed to recover over an
argument that the appendectomy benefited rather than injured
her. The Restatement of Torts drives home this principle by
using the illustration of a patient who protests treatment stating
that even if medical testimony shows the patient would have
died without the operation and that the operation effected a
complete cure, the physician would still be liable.5 5 It seems
reasonable that this would be tempered by the proposition that
damages may be reduced where a diminution of future pain or
illness by the performance of a necessary operation can be dem-
onstrated.5 6 The relative modesty of some awards in the opera-
tions which are extended beyond the area of consent 7 can per-
haps be explained on the grounds that this was argued effectively
to the jury.
The technical assault and battery cases in medical torts per-
haps are different in some respects from the traditional handling
of wilful assaults where the defendant intends to do harm. A
general observation may be made that the causal connection be-
tween intentional torts and compensable damages is demanded
with much less vigor by the courts than that causal connection
which must be present between a negligent act and the injury.58
In other words, the ambit of liability is greater for intentional
54 350 Ill. App. 471, 113 N. E. 2d 327 (1953). Compare Wilson v. Lehman,
379 S. W. 2d 478 (Ky. App. 1964), where the court said "it was interesting
to note" that although the patient alleged injury because of the treatment,
her testimony showed much improvement in her condition. This perhaps
had a bearing on the court's finding against the patient on another point.
5 Restatement (2d), Torts § 13(c) (1965).
5 Restatement, Torts § 920 (1934).
57 See, e.g., Rogers v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., supra n. 53 at 652
($3,500.00 in damages was awarded for a complete hysterectomy). The case
attracted some attention also for its holding a consent form, which was ap-
parently fairly standard at the time, as "having no possible effect upon the
legal issue of consent . . .", it being "so ambiguous as to be almost com-
pletely worthless." Each such decision produces a redrafting of consent
form, and now a number of them are used for the same operation. The sig-
nature of not only the patient but his family are customarily procured. It
appears that one difficulty is that surgeons do not like to specify the par-
ticular treatment, doubtless because of the notion that without specification
they can extend or vary the operation as medical exigencies dictate. Ruth
R. Budd, Consent Forms and Procedures in Atlanta Hospitals (1964) (on
file at offices of the Journal of Public Law, Emory Law School, Atlanta,
Ga.).
58 A typical statement illustrating this principle was made by the court in
Kopka v. Bell Telephone Co., of Pennsylvania, 371 Pa. 444, 445, 91 A. 2d 232,
234 (1952), where the court said, "The authorities are clear to the effect
that where the complaint is for trespass . . . the trespasser becomes liable
not only for personal injuries resulting directly and proximately from the
trespass but also for those which are indirect and consequential."
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torts. This is not always true where the assault and battery was
committed by a surgeon acting in good faith and without provable
negligence. The causal connection between the battery, the un-
authorized treatment, and the item for which compensation is
sought, must be proved, and a mere coincidence in time between
tort and injury will not suffice. Thus in Butler v. Molinski,59 the
plaintiff was relegated to nominal damages when she failed to
establish that the deformity of her hand was attributable to the
unauthorized treatment, rather than to the injury which itself
initially necessitated some treatment.
A more elusive causation-damages problem is created in
those cases where the tort lies in the failure of the physician
adequately to inform the patient of those risks attendant on a
particular treatment. These are the "informed consent" cases.
Typically they involve treatment which, though conducted skill-
fully, can result in injury from dangers inherent in the procedure.
Such cases generally fall into two categories. One is illustrated
by Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital,60 where the patient was
not informed that part of the procedure of a transurethral pros-
tatic resection would be the tying off of his sperm ducts. The
court said that he should have been informed that the surgery
would result in his sterilization and that failure to tie the ducts
off could result in a serious infection with dire consequences.
This would have given him the opportunity to decide intelligently
whether to undergo the operation. This is a case where the
treatment did not miscarry, and the undisclosed consequence was
not a "risk" but a certainty.
The other type of informed consent case deals with the un-
expected bad result; the unexplained risk that comes to fruition.
In Natanson v. Kline° l cobalt radiation treatment, administered
without negligence, produced serious injuries. The dangers of
this treatment are great, and such results can sometimes be ex-
pected. The court in commenting on the causal connection be-
tween the failure to warn and the injury, set out the necessary
causal connection in both types of informed consent cases. If
the patient would have taken the cobalt radiation treatment
even though the physician warned her it involved a great risk
of bodily injury, the failure to warn could not be considered
the proximate cause of the injury. Physicians have suggested
that in many cases the patient would consent to go ahead with
the operation even if all the unfortunate possibilities were ex-
plained to him.62 If a physician can successfully convince the
jury of this, then according to Natanson there would be no
59 198 Tenn. 124, 277 S. W. 2d 448 (1955).
60 251 Minn. 427, 88 N. W. 2d 186 (1958).
61 187 Kan. 186, 354 P. 2d 670 (1960).
62 See generally, Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 11
Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 249 (1962).
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causation and thus no recovery. This has probably been the
case in some instances, such as one where the plaintiff found her-
self in the position of arguing that if she had been informed that
the risk of contracting viral hepatitis from a whole blood trans-
fusion was less than 1% and that the fatality rate from the
disease was one-half of that, she would have refused the badly
needed transfusion.
63
It is arguable that this causation requirement does not con-
form to traditional battery law, at least in the cases centered on
the miscarriage of careful treatment. It is also questionable
whether it poses much of a problem for plaintiffs. In Natanson,
the jury was permitted to infer from the evidence as a whole
that the plaintiff, if properly warned of the risks, would have de-
clined to undergo the treatment. Plaintiff's direct testimony was
not required.6 4 In cases where the question of whether he would
have declined the operation if informed is put to the plaintiff,
who has recently acquired first-hand knowledge of what he is
risking, his denial that he would have undergone the operation
will have a ring of sincerity that will convince any fact-finder.
If the battery classification is to be carried into this area with
all its implication, and if a battery includes any unconsented-to
contact that produces bodily harm, the battery commences as
soon as the operation begins, and it does not "ripen" when the
operation miscarries. The operation itself from its inception is
the battery. This being the case, the miscarriage of the opera-
tion is simply a compensable consequence of the battery. This
approach would focus the attention of the courts on the real
problem (i.e. whether an intelligent consent could have been
given without disclosure of certain risks) rather than on the un-
productive and predetermined question of whether the patient
would have gone through with the treatment with knowledge of
its hazards. Two situations might arise which would test this
analysis. In the first, the physician fully and completely informs
the patient of risk A, and the patient consents to the operation.
The physician fails, however, to warn of risk B. During the
operation risk A occurs, causing injury. The patient later peruses
63 Fischer v. Wilmington General Hospital, 51 Del. 554, 149 A. 2d 749 (Del.
Super. 1959). The court here found no showing of proximate cause between
the failure to warn and the contraction of the disease. See also Govin v.
Hunter, 374 P. 2d 421 (Wyo. 1962); where the medical history of the patient
suing because she was not informed that a number of incisions would be
necessary to strip varicose veins from her legs seemed to make the court
dubious as to whether she was really induced to take the operation. The
court pointed out that she had had similar surgery on her other leg, that
the veins were enlarged and quite painful, and that she had come to the
defendant for the operation.
64 Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 189, 354 P. 2d 670, 673 (1960). Compare
Govin v. Hunter, supra n. 63, at 374 P. 2d 421, 423, where the court stated:
"No doubt plaintiff's testimony would nevertheless have been sufficient to
go to the jury if it had been coupled with substantial evidence to show
that plaintiff was induced by the alleged statements to have the operation."
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his medico-legal books and discovers that the physician should
have warned of risk B. His consent to the operation was not
"informed," the operation was a battery, and damages could in-
clude those injuries caused by risk A. In the second situation
a physician could be sued for performing a careful and success-
ful operation with no side effects or harmful results because he
failed to warn the patient of some of the reasonable risks of the
operation even when none of those risks became reality. In
both situations a strict application of battery principles would
result in liability, and in neither would this be a desirable result.
The causation requirement would prevent the undesirable hold-
ing. This desirable inconsistency with battery law in the
causation requirement stems from an appreciation by the courts
that in many instances they are dealing with torts which in
some areas are better handled by shading into negligence
principles.
The Requirement of Expert Testimony
The question of whether expert medical testimony is re-
quired for a plaintiff's case for malpractice is one which has
been subjected to much discussion by courts and writers. An
exhaustive annotation concludes that the overwhelming weight
of authority is that it is required.6 5 The difficulty that this rule
poses, in view of the attitude of the medical profession towards
malpractice actions against its doctors, 6 is too well known to
merit discussion. The assault and battery classification seems to
hold out a possibility of providing another method67 of circum-
venting the "conspiracy of silence." It has been said that "the
chief utility (of an assault count) from the plaintiff's viewpoint
is to negate the need of expert testimony to establish negli-
gence,"6 8 and it has been termed a "wonder drug for plain-
tiffs." 69 In the battery action, the question of whether a given
risk was discussed with the patient is a question of fact70 and
one which the jury can determine on the basis of the conflicting
oaths of the patient and the physician. Inasmuch as a battery
case theoretically dispenses with the question of whether the
65 Annot., 141 A. L. R. 2d 6 (1959).
66 See generally Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 520
(1965).
67 Other judicially developed doctrines that are undoubtedly due in part to
the difficulty of obtaining medical testimony include res ipsa loquitur and
the expanding rules of competence of medical witnesses; i.e., the relaxation
of the requirement that testimony must be elicited from a physician fa-
miliar with local standards of professional competence.
68 Louisell & Williams, Trial of Medical Malpractice Cases, 224 (1960); Mc-
Coid, op. cit. supra n. 5 at 384.
69 Karchmer, Informed Consent: A Plaintiff's Medical Malpractice "Won-
der Drug," 31 Mo. L. Rev. 29 (1965).
70 See Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N. M. 221, 377 P. 2d 520 (1962).
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treatment was skillfully administered, medical testimony to
establish the standard of professional care in the community is
not needed. This question has been treated by many writers,
and the cases bearing on it have been collected and exhaustively
analyzed in a number of articles.7 1 There is no need to plow this
ground again. However, it is submitted that a blanket state-
ment that assault and battery actions need no expert medical
testimony is too broad and needs many qualifications. It goes too
far because a number of courts appear to treat the "informed
consent" cases as "malpractice" cases and avoid categorizing
them as assault and battery situations.7 2 When this is done, ex-
pert testimony enters the picture. The statement is also mis-
leading because of the "informed consent" rule itself, and also
because of the exceptions to the rule.
The "informed consent" rule, as formulated by McCoid and
accepted by many courts, is that the physician has a duty to
make a reasonable disclosure of the nature of the infirmity, the
nature of the operation, and some of the more probable con-
sequences and difficulties inherent in the proposed operation.
71
These consequences and difficulties have been termed the "rec-
ognized risks" 74 of the treatment. The difficulty lies not in the
factual determination as to what was disclosed to the patient;
it lies in the establishing of the "recognized risks." This can
71 See, e.g., Annot., 79 A. L. R. 2d 1028 (1961); Annot., 99 A. L. R. 2d 599
(1965); 1 Averbach & Belli, Tort and Medical Yearbook 455 (1961); Bellamy,
Malpractice Risks Confronting the Psychiatrist: Nationwide Fifteen-Year
Study of Appellate Court Cases 1946-1961, 118 Am. J. Psychiatry 769 (1962);
Franklin, Medical Mass Screening Programs: A Legal Appraisal, 47 Cornell
L. Q. 205, 218 (1962); Hendrix, Informed Consent-New Area of Malprac-
tice Liability, June, 1960 Medicolegal Digest 11; Johnson, Medical Mal-
practice Doctrines of Res Ipsa Loquitur and Informed Consent, 27 Colo. L.
Rev. 182 (1965); McCleary, Torts in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. Rev. 81 (1962);
Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 11 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev.
249 (1962); Note, Doctors Held to Have Duty to Disclose Risk Inherent in
Proposed Treatment, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (1960); Note, Informed Con-
sent-Reluctance of Doctors to Inform Patients Often Renders Them Liable
in Malpractice for Lack of "Informed Consent," 11 Current Med. for At-
torneys 24 (1964); Note, Informed Consent-New Theory of Liability-
Doctor's Nightmare in Malpractice, 8 Current Med. for Attorneys 35 (1961);
Note, Physicians and Surgeons-Physician's Duty to Warn of Possible Ad-
verse Results of Proposed Treatment Depends Upon General Practice Fol-
lowed by Medical Profession in the Community, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1445
(1962); Note, Malpractice-Doctors Under Duty to Disclose Risk Inherent
in Proposed Treatment, 26-27 NACCA L. J. 134 (1960-1961); Note, Mal-
practice-Physician Has a Duty to Inform Patient of Risk Inherent in
Proposed Treatment, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 768 (1961); Comment, The Law of
Medical Malpractice in Missouri, W. U. L. Q. 402, 414-15 (1962); Karchmer,
Informed Consent: A Plaintiff's Medical Malpractice "Wonder Drug," 31
Mo. L. Rev. 29 (1965). An excellent student note on the subject appears
in 4 Duquesne L. Rev. 450 (1966).
72 See, e.g., Miles v. Van Gelder, 1 Mich. App. 522, 137 N. W. 2d 292 (1965).
73 McCoid, op. cit. supra n. 5 at 427.
74 Woods v. Brumlop, supra n. 70.
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be ascertained only by medical experience, and testimony is
needed in all but clear-cut cases that the particular risk lay
within the range of the "more probable consequences and dif-
ficulties inherent in the operation." Some courts, recognizing
that this question ultimately depends on the medical profession,
have said that whether certain possibilities should have been
disclosed depends on an inquiry into what the local medical pro-
fession would do in such a case7 5 and that the custom of the
medical profession to warn must be established by expert medi-
cal testimony. 76 This approach clouds the issue. Even if the
local profession does not inform of certain risks, this has only
a derivative relevance on the question of whether the risk is
so likely to occur that a patient should be informed of it. This
approach has been discredited in other areas of tort law, and it
is quite clear that an industry cannot by concurring in sub-
standard practices set their own standard of care. The proper
inquiry to put to the medical profession is what can happen, and
how likely is it to happen? The essential question is the quantity
and quality of the risks not whether the profession customarily
warns of such possibilities. But with this approach medical testi-
mony often will be required, with all that the requirement por-
tends. It would seem reasonable to permit a plaintiff in such
cases to establish the risks attendant on a given treatment by
reference to either medical testimony or to medical literature.77
A statistical showing could suffice to show that a given bad
result of an operation was sufficiently likely to come about to
demand that the patient be warned.
One of the exceptions to the "informed consent" rule in-
evitably leads to expert testimony being put into the case. That
exception is that full disclosure is not demanded where an ex-
planation of every risk may result in alarming a patient who is
already apprehensive and where such disclosure would tend to
increase the risk itself by subjecting the patient to emotional
upset.78 Although this will ordinarily be dealt with as a matter
of defense and the burden of coming within this exception after
a prima facie case of no consent has been made rests on the de-
fendant,79 it would be wise for the plaintiff to counter with ex-
pert testimony of his own.
This is not to say that one cannot avoid the requirement of
75 Natanson v. Kline, supra n. 64, at 1106; Phifer v. Baker, 34 Wyo. 415, 244
Pac. 637 (1933).
76 Govin v. Hunter, supra n. 63.
77 Two states have enacted statutes permitting the use of medical treatises.
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 233, § 79 c (1956); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 51.040 (1960).
78 Salgo v. Leland, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P. 2d 170 (1957); Natanson v.
Kline, supra n. 64; Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N. C. 517, 88 S. E. 2d 762 (1955).
79 In Woods v. Brumlop, supra n. 70, defendant failed to introduce evidence
of the emotional condition of the plaintiff, and thus failed to come within
the exception.
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expert testimony in a battery case. However, whether such
testimony is required must depend upon the facts of each case.
In clear-cut situations, such as where the operation extends to
and injures another part of the body not under treatment,80 or
where the operation includes what has been expressly pro-
hibited by the patient,"' no expert testimony will be required to
prove any part of the patient's case. In other cases, where the
assault and battery are truly technical, expert testimony will be
required. Two recent Michigan cases draw the line between
these situations.
In Miles v. Van Gelder, 2 the plaintiff underwent a hemila-
minectomy to correct what had been diagnosed as a slipped disk.
After the operation the incision failed to heal properly, and
spinal fluid drained from it for some time. The plaintiff's action
was founded in part on the failure of the defendant to warn
him that the operation could result in this condition. The court
applied the general rule in malpractice situations, i.e., that the
conduct on the part of the defendants must be proved to fall
below the standard of the medical practitioner in the locality.
Thus expert testimony was demanded.
A few months later the same court decided the case of
Schulman v. Lerner.8 3 The plaintiff went to the defendant, an
ophthalmologist, suffering from an apparent sty. The diagnosis
was that the membomian glands were infected and would have
to be drained. The plaintiff was prepared for treatment; a local
anesthetic was administered; and instead of merely draining
the glands, the defendant removed them along with a stray
freckle. The action here was assault and battery, and the issue
was whether plaintiff impliedly consented to the removal of the
glands. He did not consent and recovered with no expert testi-
mony required.
Conclusion
When compared with other illnesses of the law of medical
malpractice, the technical assault and battery problem does not
appear to be a major one. It is useful enough when the medical
treatment is wholly without consent, when the operation extends
to parts of the body not within the immediate area the treat-
ment was scheduled for, and when the physician has deceived
the patient. The problems arise when the case deals with par-
tial consent and when the plaintiff's charge is that while he con-
sented to the operation, he was not adequately informed of its
risks. In most of these cases the treatment has miscarried, and
80 See, e.g., Johnson v. Van Werden, 255 Iowa 1285, 125 N. W. 2d 782 (1964).
81 Rolater v. Strain, supra n. 3.
82 Supra n. 72.
83 2 Mich. App. 705, 141 N. W. 2d 348 (1966).
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the assault and battery classification shades into this area be-
cause of judicial pressure which recognizes the difficulty plain-
tiffs have in proving negligence. The effectiveness of this as a
solution to the difficulties of making a case is diminished con-
siderably in that in the majority of informed consent cases the
plaintiff will need expert testimony at some stage of the trial.
This is remedied not by an expansion of assault and battery
law, but by more direct approaches such as admission of medical
literature to establish professional misconduct, expanding the
class of eligible medical witnesses both geographically and in
terms of specialties, or best of all, obtaining the cooperation of
the medical profession.
In other problem areas courts have shown considerable flexi-
bility. Special malpractice statutes of limitations apply rather
than assault and battery limitation statutes; causation is handled
in a way more nearly similar to negligence doctrines than tradi-
tional assault and battery doctrines; malpractice insurance
policies are construed to cover liability losses, as doctors rea-
sonably expected they would; damage awards seem to take into
consideration the fact that sometimes a benefit occurs to the
plaintiff. The only area where judicial treatment has seemed
unwise is in actions under the Federal Torts Claims Act. It is
doubtful whether Congress ever thought of the technical medi-
cal assault and battery situations when they excluded batteries
by government employees, and a one-case trend has developed
to correct earlier holdings that such actions were barred. Both
assault and battery actions and traditional negligence actions are
losing their shape as courts develop a body of malpractice law
with its own structure to deal with torts arising out of the
doctor-patient relationship.
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